University Library, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

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Showing 41–80 of 54,797 items
  • Franklin's Ground Squirrel Survey on Interstate 90 from Interstate 294 to Sandwald Road Summer 2006
    Scholarship
    Creator
    Mengelkoch, Jean
    Description
    Report issued on: November 30, 2006
  • Trusted CI Webinar: Trustworthy Computing for Scientific Workflows
    Scholarship
    Creator
    • Lapets, Andrei
    • Varia, Mayank
    Description
    There has been an unprecedented increase in the quantity of research data available in digital form. Combining these information sources within analyses that leverage cloud computing frameworks and big data analytics platforms has the potential to lead to groundbreaking innovations and scientific insights. As developers and operators of the widely used Dataverse repository and the Massachusetts Open Cloud platform, we have been working to advance this innovative revolution by colocating datasets in common platforms, curating and tagging datasets with both functional and legal access policies, offering helper services such as search and easy citation to promote sharing, and providing on-demand computational platforms to ease analytics. Unfortunately, we observe that a certain segment of our scientific user base cannot enjoy the full transformative capacity achievable within our cyberinfrastructure. Due to concerns over the privacy and confidentiality of their data sources, or the potential of commercial exploitation of their raw data sets, these researchers are isolating themselves within siloed data repositories and well-protected computational enclaves rather than sharing their datasets with fellow scientists. This talk will describe cryptographic technological enhancements that are ready to provide scientific researchers with mechanisms to do collaborative analytics over their datasets while keeping those datasets protected and confidential. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) is a cryptographic technology that allows independent organizations to compute an analytic jointly over their data in such a manner that nobody learns anything other than the desired output. Hence, MPC empowers organizations to make their data available for collective data aggregation and analysis while still adhering to pre-existing confidentiality constraints, legal restrictions, or corporate policies governing data sharing. Our new Conclave framework can connect to many existing backend stacks where the data already live, can automatically analyze a query to identify when a computation must cross data silos, and can leverage MPC in a scalable and usable manner when it is necessary to enable the computation. In summary, while data sharing cyberinfrastructures today are intended to allow everyone to benefit from the initial cost of having one researcher collect data, privacy concerns (and the resulting breakdown of data sharing) transform this burden into a marginal cost that every researcher who wants access to the data must pay. We will describe how a holistic integration of secure MPC into a scientific computing infrastructure addresses a growing need in research computing: enabling scientific workflows involving collaborative experiments or replication/extension of existing results when the underlying data are encumbered by privacy constraints. Mayank Varia is a research associate professor of computer science at Boston University and the co-director of the Center on Reliable Information Systems & Cyber Security (RISCS). His research interests span theoretical and applied cryptography and their application to problems throughout and beyond computer science. He currently directs an NSF Frontier project that addresses grand challenges in cloud security, aiming to design an architecture where the security of the system as a whole can be derived in a modular, composable fashion from the security of its components (bu.edu/macs). He received a Ph.D. in mathematics from MIT for his work on program obfuscation. Andrei Lapets is Associate Professor of the Practice in Computer Science, Director of Research Development at the Hariri Institute for Computing, and Director of the Software & Application Innovation Lab at Boston University. His research interests include cybersecurity, formal methods and domain-specific programming language design, and data science. He holds a Ph.D. from Boston University, and A.B. and S.M. degrees from Harvard University.
  • Preventing History Forgery with Secure Provenance
    Scholarship
    Creator
    • Sion, Radu
    • Hasan, Ragib
    • Winslett, Marianne
  • Know Why Your Access Was Denied: Regulating Feedback for Usable Security
    Scholarship
    Creator
    • Kapadia, Apu C.
    • Sampemane, Geetanjali
    Description
    We examine the problem of providing useful feedback to users who are denied access to resources, while controlling the disclosure of the system security policies. High-quality feedback enhances the usability of a system, especially when permissions may depend on contextual information---time of day, temperature of a room and other factors that change unpredictably. However, providing too much information to the user may breach the confidentiality of the system policies. To achieve a balance between system usability and privacy of security policies, we present Know, a framework that uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) and cost functions to provide feedback to users about access control decisions. Know honors a system's privacy requirements, which are represented as a meta-policy, and generates permissible and relevant feedback to users on how to obtain access to a resource. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to address the need of access control feedback while honoring the privacy and confidentiality requirements of a system's security policy.
  • Analyzing & designing the security of shared resources on smartphone operating systems
    Scholarship
    Creator
    Demetriou, Soteris
    Description
    Smartphone penetration surpassed 80% in the US and nears 70% in Western Europe. In fact, smartphones became the de facto devices users leverage to manage personal information and access external data and other connected devices on a daily basis. To support such multi-faceted functionality, smartphones are designed with a multi-process architecture, which enables third-party developers to build smartphone applications which can utilize smartphone internal and external resources to offer creative utility to users. Unfortunately, such third-party programs can exploit security inefficiencies in smartphone operating systems to gain unauthorized access to available resources, compromising the confidentiality of rich, highly sensitive user data. The smartphone ecosystem, is designed such that users can readily install and replace applications on their smartphones. This facilitates users’ efforts in customizing the capabilities of their smartphones tailored to their needs. Statistics report an increasing number of available smartphone applications— in 2017 there were approximately 3.5 million third-party apps on the official application store of the most popular smartphone platform. In addition we expect users to have approximately 95 such applications installed on their smartphones at any given point. However, mobile apps are developed by untrusted sources. On Android—which enjoys 80% of the smartphone OS market share—application developers are identified based on self-sign certificates. Thus there is no good way of holding a developer accountable for a malicious behavior. This creates an issue of multi-tenancy on smartphones where principals from diverse untrusted sources share internal and external smartphone resources. Smartphone OSs rely on traditional operating system process isolation strategies to confine untrusted third-party applications. However this approach is insufficient because incidental seemingly harmless resources can be utilized by untrusted tenants as side-channels to bypass the process boundaries. Smartphones also introduced a permission model to allow their users to govern third-party application access to system resources (such as camera, microphone and location functionality). However, this permission model is both coarse-grained and does not distinguish whether a permission has been declared by a trusted or an untrusted principal. This allows malicious applications to perform privilege escalation attacks on the mobile platform. To make things worse, applications might include third- party libraries, for advertising or common recognition tasks. Such libraries share the process address space with their host apps and as such can inherit all the privileges the host app does. Identifying and mitigating these problems on smartphones is not a trivial process. Manual analysis on its own of all mobile apps is cumbersome and impractical, code analysis techniques suffer from scalability and coverage issues, ad-hoc approaches are impractical and susceptible to mistakes, while sometimes vulnerabilities are well hidden at the interplays between smartphone tenants and resources. In this work I follow an analytical approach to discover major security and privacy issues on smartphone platforms. I utilize the Android OS as a use case, because of its open-source nature but also its popularity. In particular I focus on the multi-tenancy characteristic of smartphones and identify the re- sources each tenant within a process, across processes and across devices can access. I design analytical tools to automate the discovery process, attacks to better understand the adversary models, and introduce design changes to the participating systems to enable robust fine-grained access control of resources. My approach revealed a new understanding of the threats introduced from third-party libraries within an application process; it revealed new capabilities of the mobile application adversary exploiting shared filesystem and permission resources; and shows how a mobile app adversary can exploit shared communication mediums to compromise the confidentiality of the data collected by external devices (e.g. fitness and medical accessories, NFC tags etc.). Moreover, I show how we can eradicate these problems following an architectural design approach to introduce backward-compatible, effective and efficient modifications in operating systems to achieve fine-grained application access to shared resources. My work has let to security changes in the official release of Android by Google.